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AUTHOR’S MAIN MESSAGE
Despite the ongoing recovery, the Spanish labor market is still far from doing well. Youth unemployment as well as 
both temporary and long-term unemployment remain significant problems. Issues also exist with respect to immigrant 
workers and wage inequality, particularly for lower-wage workers. On the positive side, the labor force participation 
gender gap has shrunk considerably. Policymakers could combat the long-term unemployment challenge by putting 
more efforts into the design, implementation, and evaluation of well-targeted active labor market policies.
Unemployment rate and real monthly wagesELEVATOR PITCH
Spain, the fourth largest eurozone economy, was hit 
particularly hard by the Great Recession, which made 
its chronic labor market problems more evident. Youth 
and long-term unemployment escalated during the crisis 
and, despite the ongoing recovery, in 2016 were still at 
unsustainably high levels. The aggregate rate of temporary 
employment declined during the recession, but grew 
among youth. Most interesting have been the narrowing 
of the gender gap in labor force participation, the decline 
in the share of immigrants in employment and the labor 
force, and the overall increase in wage inequality.
KEY FINDINGS
Cons
 Youth and long-term unemployment skyrocketed 
during the Great Recession; in 2016 they were still 
both very high and very far from their pre-crisis 
levels.
 Male labor force participation fell because of the 
drastic reduction in young men’s participation in 
the aftermath of the crisis.
 The rate of temporary employment escalated 
significantly among youth.
 Immigrants were hit particularly hard by the Great 
Recession. 
 Real wages declined during the recession and have 
not returned yet to their pre-recession levels.
Pros
 Employment has grown at an average annual rate 
of 2.3% since 2014.
 The gender gaps in labor force participation and 
temporary employment were smaller in 2016 than 
before the recession.
 The overall rate of temporary employment 
decreased in the wake of the Great Recession.
 The share of immigrant employment started 
growing again after 2014, albeit slowly.
 Both overall monthly wage inequality and 
inequality in the lower half of the monthly wage 
distribution started decreasing slowly in 2013.
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística unemployment and mean wage 
statistics. Online at: http://www.ine.es/jaxiT3/Tabla.htm?t=4086&L=0; 
http://www.ine.es/inebmenu/indice.htm
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MOTIVATION
Spain, the fourth largest eurozone economy, was one of the OECD countries hit hardest by 
the Great Recession. Many aspects of Spain’s labor market have suffered as a result and, 
despite some recovery, significant challenges remain. It is thus useful to highlight those 
areas of the Spanish labor market that are doing well and those that are still performing 
poorly. This is crucial information for understanding labor market policy debates as well 
as the general background of academic discussions.
DISCUSSION OF PROS AND CONS
Aggregate issues
The Great Recession hit Spain in 2008 after the longest period of expansion in its 
economic history (1994–2007). As in many other EU countries, the Great Recession in 
Spain consisted of two consecutive recessions. The first recession (second quarter of 
2008 to fourth quarter of 2009), triggered by the international financial crisis, was 
followed by a short-lived recovery and then a second recession (fourth quarter of 2010 
to second quarter of 2013), unleashed by the eurozone crisis. These two recessionary 
periods, as established by the official timing of recessions of the Spanish Business Cycle 
Dating Committee, are shown with shaded areas in all figures.
The Spanish double-dip Great Recession has been by far the longest since 1975, when 
General Franco died after 36 years of dictatorship and the transition to democracy 
began. The effects of the external negative shocks on the economy were aggravated by the 
bursting of a big housing bubble along with a large-scale banking crisis and subsequent 
reduction of bank credit to firms. Additionally, Spanish labor market institutions, often 
labeled as dysfunctional, consisted of dual employment protection legislation and a rigid 
collective bargaining system. This combination caused the labor market to adjust to 
negative shocks mostly through dismissals. In this context, employment contraction and 
unemployment growth were more dramatic during the Great Recession than in any of the 
previous crises for which data are available.
Figure 1 shows the aggregate unemployment, job-separation, and job-finding rates from 
2002 through 2016. The job-separation rate is computed as the number of non-working 
individuals who had a job in the previous quarter expressed as a share of all employed 
individuals in the previous quarter. Analogously, the job-finding rate is the number of 
working individuals who were out of work in the previous quarter expressed as a share of 
all employed individuals in the previous quarter. Note that the two rates are comparable 
because they are both computed as a share of the same group of individuals (those who 
were working in the previous quarter), and the difference between the job-finding and job 
separation rates is the net employment growth rate. Quarterly values were then averaged 
over each year to obtain annual values, as is the case with all the labor market quantities 
shown in this article.
Unemployment almost reached 19% at the end of the first recession, peaking at about 
27% in early 2013. It has been on the decline since then. Moreover, since 2014, the job-
finding rate has been higher than the job-separation rate, which implies that new jobs 
were created. In particular, employment has grown at an average annual rate of 2.3% since 
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2014. However, the share of the working-age population in employment stood at 47.6% in 
2016, 6.8% points below its pre-crisis rate, representing a jobs deficit of 2.238 million. By 
2016, aggregate unemployment was still at 19.6%, almost 11.4 percentage points higher 
than it was in 2007. The high level and pronounced volatility of the unemployment rate is 
not a new phenomenon, as this marks the third time that it rose above 20% in less than 
30 years.
Further reasons for concern can be found when dissecting this aggregate scenario, as 
long-term unemployment reached unprecedented levels in the aftermath of the Great 
Recession. According to the standard definition in Spain, unemployed individuals who 
have been actively seeking work for more than one year are classified as long-term 
unemployed. Figure 1 further distinguishes between the percentage of unemployed 
individuals, with unemployment spells lasting between one and two years, and the very 
long-term unemployed, with spells lasting more than two years. The share of individuals 
who have been unemployed for one to two years peaked in 2010 at about 26%, while 
the percentage of very long-term unemployed individuals kept rising until reaching 44.5% 
in 2015. In 2016, 42.3% of all unemployed individuals (and 8.3% of the labor force) 
had been out of a job for more than two years, almost 3.5 times more than shortly 
before the Great Recession. Such pervasiveness of long-term unemployment stands 
out from a historical perspective as well as internationally, with the Spanish long-term 
unemployment rate being the second largest in the EU (after Greece).
Long-term unemployment in Spain disproportionally affects older and less-educated 
workers [1]. Moreover, there is a negative relationship between the probability of exiting 
Figure 1. Total unemployment rate, job-separation and job-finding rates, and percentage 
of long-term unemployed
Note: Shaded areas indicate periods of recession.
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística unemployment rates. Online at:  http://www.ine.es/jaxiT3/Tabla.
htm?t=4112&L=0; and Fedea job-separation and job-finding rates. Online at: http://www.fedea.net/# 
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unemployment and the duration of unemployment spells, so finding a job becomes 
increasingly harder for long-term unemployed individuals. Hence, Spain’s high levels of 
long- and very long-term unemployment entail a risk of social exclusion for the affected 
individuals, and getting them back to work is a crucial challenge for policymakers.
The demographics of unemployment: Age and gender
Figure 2 shows another troublesome aspect of the Spanish labor market: its huge rate 
of unemployment among youth, which is far from being a new phenomenon [2]. Youth 
unemployment rose dramatically throughout the Great Recession, peaking at 55.5% in 
2013, and has been on the decline since then. However, by 2016, youth unemployment 
was still at 44.5%, more than twice its 2007 pre-recession level.
Figure 2. Unemployment rates by age group and gender
Note: Shaded areas indicate periods of recession.
Source: Author’s own calculations based on data from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística. Online at: http://www.ine.
es/jaxiT3/Tabla.htm?t=4086&L=0
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The dual nature of the Spanish labor market, in which temporary contracts with low 
firing costs and open-ended contracts with high firing costs coexist, likely helps to explain 
the strong volatility of youth unemployment over the business cycle. Indeed, from peak 
to trough, the unemployment rate increased by 37 percentage points among young 
individuals, whose rate of temporary employment is also higher, against a 17 percentage 
point increase among their prime-aged counterparts.
Despite the fact that the ratio of young to prime-aged unemployment has remained 
fairly stable since the 1990s in Spain, the concentration of unemployment among youth 
in several countries (notably in Southern Europe) has been one crucial driver of the 
increasing divergence of unemployment rates across Europe [3].
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Along with the aggregate and youth unemployment rates, Figure 2 also presents the 
unemployment rates of adult men and women. The unemployment rate of adult women 
has always been above that of men, and the unemployment gender gap was already 
decreasing before the Great Recession, during which it reached its minimum of 0.5 
percentage points in 2012. However, the unemployment gender gap started widening 
again after 2012, and by 2016 it was somewhat higher than in 2008.
Labor force participation: Aggregate, by gender and by age
In contrast to the strong counter-cyclical behavior of unemployment, the aggregate 
labor force participation rate (depicted in Figure 3) continued on its upward trend in 
the aftermath of the international financial crisis. It peaked at 60.4% in 2012 and barely 
fluctuated thereafter, such that by 2016 it was about where it stood in 2007.
Figure 3. Labor force participation rates
Note: Shaded areas indicate periods of recession.
Source: Author’s own calculations based on data from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística. Online at: http://www.ine.
es/jaxiT3/Tabla.htm?t=4050&L=0
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However, this aggregate pattern masks interesting gender differences. Figure 3 also shows 
that, since the Great Recession started, there has been both a reduction in men’s labor 
force participation, which fell by over five percentage points between 2007 and 2016, and 
an increase in women’s labor force participation, which in 2012 peaked at around 54% and 
in 2016 was over four percentage points higher than shortly before the crisis. As a result, 
the gender gap in labor force participation has narrowed markedly from 19.9 to 11.5 
percentage points between 2007 and 2016. While this has been the case for most OECD 
economies, Spain has experienced the strongest convergence over this time period.
The gender gap in labor force participation has fallen for all age groups since 2007, 
but further analyses by age reveal other stark differences. In particular, the rise in 
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women’s labor force participation was largest among women aged 55 and older, while 
the participation rate for men in this age group remained fairly stable throughout the 
recession. The pattern was similar for prime-aged individuals. In contrast, participation 
fell for both young women and young men, although the reduction in participation was 
more pronounced for men.
These labor force participation patterns by gender and age suggest that, in the wake of 
the Great Recession, the “added worker effect” is likely to have been at play for adult 
women. In other words, adult women’s labor supply may have increased as a response 
to their partners’ job losses and the associated reduction in household income. In 
contrast, the “discouraged worker effect” (withdrawal from the labor market because 
of failed searches and dim prospects) may have played a role for young men, given 
the pervasiveness of youth unemployment and the unprecedented levels of long-term 
unemployment. In this context, it is worth stressing that, during the crisis, many job 
losses in Spain were concentrated in male-dominated sectors, in the construction sector 
in particular, while sectors with more female employment generally fared better. In 
particular, the contribution of the construction sector to total employment dropped by 
more than half between 2008 and 2016 as it fell to 5.8%, while the percentage of male 
versus female workers in this sector hovered around 92% through the same period. In 
contrast, in the service sector, employment grew from about 68% to 76% between 2008 
and 2016, while the percentage of female versus male workers remained fairly stable at 
around 54%.
Employment composition: The share of temporary jobs
Figure 4 shows the percentage of employees who have a temporary job in order to 
illustrate the most visible symptom of the dual nature of the Spanish labor market. 
Before the Great Recession the overall share of temporary jobs was above 30%, almost 
three times the OECD average, with temporary employment being more prevalent among 
women and youth. After its 2006 peak of almost 33%, the rate of temporary employment 
declined to its lowest point, dipping below 24% at the end of the second recession. This 
decline illustrates that job destruction during the crisis was disproportionally borne 
by temporary workers. Since then, the rate of temporary employment has rebounded, 
but, at 26% in 2016, it was still below its pre-crisis level. Interestingly, the gender gap in 
temporary employment narrowed until almost closing in 2015. By 2016, the gender gap 
in temporary employment appeared to reopen, but it was still about three percentage 
points smaller than at the beginning of the recession.
In stark contrast with the decline of the overall rate of temporary employment during 
the Great Recession, the share of young temporary employees sharply increased during 
the same period; in 2016, it was 72.7%, more than ten percentage points above its 2007 
level. The rate of part-time employment also increased dramatically among youth during 
the crisis, as it escalated from 21.3% in 2007 to its peak of around 40% at the end of the 
second recession.
While both part-time jobs and temporary jobs provide flexibility to employers and 
employment opportunities for certain labor force groups, some concerns remain. In the 
case of part-time employment, it seems it is becoming increasingly involuntary, as 61% of 
part-time workers declared they were in part-time employment only because they could 
not find a full-time job in 2016 (against 32% in 2007) [4].
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Regarding temporary contracts, in Spain, as in other OECD countries, many young 
people enter the labor market through this form of employment. However, Spanish youth 
tend to stay on temporary contracts much longer than elsewhere and face frequent 
unemployment spells between one temporary contract and the next [5]. Indeed, 
Spain’s transition rates from unemployment or temporary employment into permanent 
employment are among the lowest in the OECD [6].
Immigration before and after the Great Recession
During the pre-crisis expansionary phase Spain received large inflows of immigrants who 
substantially modified its demographic structure and joined its labor force. Immigrants, 
however, were hit particularly hard by the Great Recession [7]. Figure 5 shows the 
percentage of immigrants in the working-age population, in the labor force, and in the 
total employed population, all of which were on a rapidly rising trend before the recession. 
The share of immigrant employment peaked in 2008 at almost 14%, before markedly 
declining thereafter, reaching a low of 10.6% in 2014. The percentage of immigrants in 
the working-age population and in the labor force peaked in 2009, one year later than the 
share of immigrant employment, and by 2016 they had not yet rebounded. In contrast, 
the share of immigrant employment started growing again after 2014, albeit slowly.
In sum, job destruction during the crisis was disproportionally borne by foreign workers, 
who were over-represented in the sectors that were hit hardest by the recession, and, as 
a consequence, Spain has experienced net migration outflows since the beginning of the 
2010s [8].
Figure 4. Percentage of employees with a temporary contract
Note: Shaded areas indicate periods of recession.
Source: Author’s own calculations based on data from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística. Online at:  http://www.
ine.es/dynt3/inebase/es/index.htm?padre=982&capsel=985
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Wage developments
Before going into detail on wage developments please note that in this and subsequent 
sections inflation is accounted for in order to capture changes over time in the economic 
well-being of workers. To this end, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) is used to deflate 
nominal wages and to obtain real wages.
Aggregate developments
The Spanish Labor Force Survey (LFS) only started including workers’ monthly wages 
in 2006. Moreover, the Spanish National Statistical Office decided not to ask LFS 
respondents about their earnings directly and to instead obtain their monthly wages 
from administrative sources (i.e. tax and social security registries). This implies that 
wage data are released later than the rest of the data and that the latest wage figures 
available refer to 2015. Hence, in order to obtain a longer annual series on aggregate 
wages, data are also taken from the Quarterly Labor Costs Survey (QLCS), which is a 
questionnaire directly filled in by formal establishments throughout the country. Note, 
however, that the QLCS coverage, unlike that of the LFS, is not comprehensive, as it 
excludes agriculture, forestry, and fishing employees, household employees, and some 
public employees.
Figure 6 displays LFS mean and median real wages from 2006 to 2016 and QLCS mean 
real wages from 2002 to 2016. Regardless of the wage measure used, the figure indicates 
that, while real wage growth accelerated in the few years preceding the Great Recession, 
Figure 5. Percentage of immigrants in the total working-age, active, and employed populations
Note: Shaded areas indicate periods of recession.
Source: Author’s own calculations based on data from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística. Online at: http://www.ine.
es/inebmenu/indice.htm
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Figure 6. Real monthly wages
Note: Shaded areas indicate periods of recession.
Source: Author’s own calculations based on data from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística. Online at: http://www.ine.es/
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real wages fell markedly during the crisis, and have not yet returned to their pre-recession 
levels. In particular, mean real wages peaked in 2009 before falling to around 93% of their 
2009 levels in 2013. Real wage growth has been positive since 2013, but real wages are still 
below their 2008 levels. Interestingly, median real wages kept on rising until 2010 despite 
dramatic job losses, which likely reflects rigidities in the Spanish system of collective 
bargaining. There is also evidence that wage adjustments were disproportionally borne 
by young and new employees [5].
Changing wage inequality
Figure 7 presents several indicators to study the evolution of wage inequality from 2006 
through 2015. Note that the focus is on monthly wages of all employees (both full-
time and part-time employees). There are two main reasons for adopting this focus, 
despite the marked change in part-time employment since the beginning of the Great 
Recession. First, labor earnings, whether from full- or part-time employment, are the 
main component of individual income. Second, there is evidence that the increase in 
part-time employment was largely involuntary, as most part-time employees would 
have preferred to work full-time had they been able to. However, additional context is 
provided by contrasting the results obtained using monthly wages with those obtained 
using hourly wages.
In particular, Figure 7 displays the following ratios of monthly wages of workers at different 
points of the wage distribution: the 50/10 ratio (wages at the median divided by wages 
at the first decile), which measures inequality in the bottom half of the distribution; the 
90/50 ratio, which measures inequality in the upper half of the distribution; the 90/10 
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ratio, which can be viewed as a measure of overall inequality; and the 90/80 ratio, which 
focuses on earners nearer (but still not at) the top.
Consider first the evolution of the 90/50 ratio between 2006 and 2015. This ratio has 
risen over the period, but the change has been small (at around 2.5%), suggesting that 
wage inequality in the upper half of the distribution has remained fairly stable. Similarly, 
the 90/80 ratio has increased only slightly (by 2.3%). Hence, wage inequality has not 
risen in the upper half of the distribution either, nor has it increased among earners closer 
to the top.
In contrast, significant changes in inequality are shown by the paths of the 50/10 and 
90/10 ratios. The former has risen by 15% and the latter by over 18%. Therefore, wage 
inequality has increased in general over this period and the overwhelming majority of the 
increase has taken place in the lower part of the wage distribution. However, both overall 
inequality and the 50/10 ratio started decreasing in 2013 in the wake of the recovery, 
albeit slowly. The evolution of monthly wage inequality described here is crucially linked 
to the (largely involuntary) increase in part-time employment since the beginning of the 
crisis. In fact, hourly wage inequality barely changed (or even slightly declined) since 2008.
LIMITATIONS AND GAPS
The biggest gap in describing recent developments in the Spanish labor market is in the 
area of earnings, and is due to two main reasons. First, the LFS did not collect wage 
information until 2006. Second, the earnings information contained in the LFS since 
2006 is obtained from administrative sources and refers to formal employees only. 
Admittedly, the self-reporting of earnings always poses challenges. However, addressing 
Figure 7. Measures of monthly wage inequality
Note: The graph displays wages at the ninth decile divided by wages at the median (90/50 ratio), wages at the 
median divided by wages at the first decile (50/10 ratio), wages at the ninth decile divided by wages at the eighth 
decile (90/80 ratio), and wages at the ninth decile divided by wages at the first decile (90/10 ratio).
Source: Author’s own calculations based on data from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística. Online at: http://www.ine.es/
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these challenges and obtaining earnings information for informal workers is important 
because the shadow economy is quite large. This unofficial segment of the economy 
represents about 20% of the Spanish GDP according to several sources and has been on 
the rise in recent years. It is therefore important to study working conditions of informal 
workers. Moreover, considering the labor earnings of self-employed workers (formal or 
not), who represent a non-negligible part of the labor force, is crucial to studying earnings 
inequality and its evolution more accurately.
SUMMARY AND POLICY ADVICE
The findings presented in this article suggest numerous policy considerations, partly 
because Spain’s chronic labor market issues became more evident in the aftermath of the 
Great Recession. Three consecutive labor market reforms were introduced between 2010 
and 2012, but it is perhaps too soon to assess whether they will succeed in mitigating the 
two main problems of Spanish labor market institutions: the rigid system of collective 
bargaining and the dual nature of employment protection legislation. Preliminary 
assessments suggest that while the reform enacted in 2012 has promoted firms’ internal 
flexibility, no reform has properly addressed the problem of duality, as the firing–cost 
gap between temporary and permanent contracts remains large [9]. This is exemplified 
by the fact that in 2016 the share of temporary employees still amounted to 26%. As a 
means for combating duality, 100 economists signed a manifesto defending the abolition 
of most temporary contracts and the introduction of a single open-ended contract for 
new hires with no ex-ante time limit and with severance payments smoothly increasing 
with seniority [10].
Importantly, previous reforms made very little progress toward the design, implementation, 
and evaluation of well-targeted active labor market policies that improve the employment 
prospects of vulnerable groups generally, and the long-term unemployed in particular 
[11]. Spain’s levels of long- and very long-term unemployment are so unsustainably high 
that they pose a risk for social cohesion, and it is unlikely that growth alone will be enough 
to get many of the long-term unemployed back to work. Moreover, public employment 
services should give priority to the early activation of the unemployed in order to avoid 
their addition to the ranks of the long-term unemployed.
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